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Abstract 
 
As of late, several state governments in Malaysia have been identified as having serious 
difficulty in meeting their financial needs, to the extent of the government being qualified 
as on the verge of bankruptcy. One of the explanations put forward is that state 
governments have been acting irresponsibly in managing finances. Thus, the question 
that ensues is: why do state governments behave in such irresponsible manner fiscally 
and financially in the first place? In this paper, we relate the financial difficulties faced 
by these governments within the confines of the institutional and political environment 
currently in place within the country. We will examine one of the institutional features of 
the intergovernmental system in Malaysia – the intergovernmental grants systems. More 
precisely, there are two hypotheses that will be tested in this research.. First, federal 
transfers may stimulate more spending by state governments which leads them to 
increase spending beyond the means available to them. Second, financial problems may 
be the consequence of a state governments’ incapacity to utilize tax capacities to the 
fullest, which in turn may be explained by the disincentives effects that are embedded 
(whether intended or not) within the transfer system.  
(Keywords: State Governments, Fiscal Behavior, Intergovernmental Relations).  
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Introduction 
 
For the past few years, several state governments in Malaysia have been identified 
as having serious difficulty in meeting their financial needs to the extent of being 
qualified as on the verge of bankruptcy
1
. In this paper, we will try to relate the financial 
difficulties faced by these state governments within the institutional and political 
environment currently in place in the country. Our main assumption is that the dire 
financial situation of some state governments in Malaysia is the direct result of the way 
the intergovernmental system is organized within the country. More precisely, there are 
two hypotheses that we test in this research. First, federal transfers may stimulate more 
spending by state governments which lead them to increase spending beyond the means 
available to them. Second, financial problems may be the consequence of the state 
governments‟ incapacity to utilize tax capacities to the fullest, which in turn may be 
explained by the disincentives effects that are embedded (whether intended or not)  
within the transfer system.  
Although the level of dependency of the state governments in Malaysia on federal 
transfers can be considered relatively low as it stood at less than 30% of their total 
revenue, this cannot be interpreted as a sign that the country is free from problems 
usually associated with countries which are highly dependant on federal transfers (see for 
example Rodden 2005). According to Bird (1998), it doesn‟t matter whether the transfer 
constitute 90 or 10% of the subnational governments‟ revenue but what is important is 
whether the transfer system is properly designed in the sense that it makes the subnational 
governments accountable of their actions both to the citizens and to the federal 
governments. In our case, we are concerned with the issue of whether the transfer system 
in Malaysia is designed in such a way that it renders the state governments to be less 
efficient in their fiscal behavior.  
          The paper is organized as follows. In the first section, we will briefly review the 
studies on the impact of intergovernmental on subnational governments. In section two, 
we will present the intergovernmental grant system as it is practiced in Malaysia 
currently. Our empirical methodology will be presented in section three and the results 
will be analyzed in section four. Finally, section five concludes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 In the report published by the Auditor-Generals Office in 2004, it was revealed that 7 out of 13 states in 
<Malaysia were  “at the verge of banckruptcy » due  to financial situations that were judged as insufficient 
as compared to their financial obligations and commitments. It was also revealed that these seven states 
have accumulated more than RM 2 billions (USD 570 million) of  arrears in loan payments to the federal 
government.  
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1. Literature Review: The Effects of Intergovernmental Transfers on Local 
Government Behavior:  
 
If it is a common place in fiscal decentralization literature to consider the 
existence of a relationship between transfers and fiscal effort, there is still no consensus 
regarding its direction or magnitude. The available empirical evidence is not conclusive 
and in some cases, it is contradictory (Litvack, Ahmad et al. 1998). Most of the analyses 
of the effect of transfers on fiscal efforts are based on descriptive statistics like comparing 
the evolution of tax collection and intergovernmental transfers (Cabrero and Orihuela 
2000). On the other hand, the use of econometric models has been limited by data 
availability and has been concentrated in developed countries such a thes United States, 
Canada and Germany (Gramlich 1987a; Bird 1994).  
          In the case of Latin American countries, Bird (1994) finds evidence of a strong 
correlation between transfers and local expenditure reductions in Colombian transfer 
programs. He concludes that receptor communities reduced their fiscal effort due to 
transfers. This result is consistent with Correa and Steiner (1999) who find evidence of 
“fiscal apathy” at the sub-national level in Colombia. Their estimates suggests that 96% 
of transfers are used to reduce local taxes and only 4% is allocated to increase local 
expenditures. Nevertheless, these results are not robust in regards to the changes in the 
time span under analysis. For instance, Garzón (1997) examines the period before and 
after the increase of transfers (1986 and 1996). He does not find evidence of a reduction 
in general tax collections among Colombian municipalities.  Chaparro et al (2004) 
examines fiscal data for a large number of Colombian municipalities for the 1985-1999 
period with an objective to describing the effects of the transfer system on horizontal 
balance among municipalities. According to the authors, the correlation between 
aggregate taxes and transfers cannot be construed as evidence of a causal relationship 
between the two, nor can it indicate how local revenues would respond if transfers were 
reduced in the future. This is due to the fact that local revenues may have increased 
because of other decentralization reforms that were contemporaneous with, but otherwise 
unrelated to, the increase in transfers. Consequently, Chaparro et al (2004) used an 
approach that allows for the possibility that per capita tax revenues vary from year to year 
in all municipalities, and consistently differ among municipalities, in ways that are 
unrelated to the effects of the transfers. In effect, their estimate of the effect of transfers 
on revenues, measures the impact of changes in the transfers received by one 
municipality, relative to others at a given point in time, on relative municipal tax 
revenues. Chaparro et al (2004) conclude that there is some evidence that transfer growth 
has discouraged tax efforts by the municipalities, even in the case of formula-driven 
Participaciones Municipales (PM) which should not in itself create a soft budget 
constraint problem. The current system of decentralization in Colombia, according to the 
authors, act as an impediment in the mobilization of local fiscal resources. More recently, 
Aragon and Gayoso (2005) examine the relationship between intergovernmental transfers 
and local fiscal efforts using an empirical model with data from local Peruvian 
governments. The paper exploits a quasi experiment and uses panel data in order to 
address any identification problems due to non-random transfer allocation and the 
presence of omitted variables. Indeed, in 2001, an additional transfer (“asignación 
adicional”) was conferred to Peruvian local governments receiving a minimum level of 
Foncomun (“Fondo de Compensación Municipal” or Municipal Compensation Funds) 
regardless of local tax collection or total expenditures. Participation in this program can 
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be used as an instrumental variable since it explains increases on transfers but it is not 
correlated to local tax collection. These results confirm the existence of a negative 
relationship between transfers and local fiscal efforts in Peru. Aragon and Gayoso (2005) 
also found that the effect of transfers on local efforts decrease with the level of per capita 
expenditure of the local government. The reduction of fiscal efforts is higher among local 
governments with lower levels of expenditures. As long as expenditure levels increase, 
the effects tends to disappear.  
          In their studies on the tax efficiency of 15 major states in India, Jha, et al. (2000) 
argue that inIndia, historically, tax efficiency has played a relatively minor role in 
resource transfers from the central government to the state and much of the transfer is 
made on the basis of need and backwardness characteristics of the recipient states. 
However, the empirical results show that that intergovernmental grants tend to be 
negatively correlated with tax efficiency. The higher the central grants, as a proportion of 
total state expenditure, the lower the tax efficiency. They also found that this effect works 
both directly through the variable “central grants as a proportion of total state 
expenditures” and indirectly through the interaction of this variable with other variables 
(namely state domestic products and the proportion of agricultural income to state 
domestic products). Rajamaran and Vashista (2000) examine the impact of state-local 
grants on the tax efforts of rural local governments (panchayats) for the Kerala state using 
data for 1993-1994. Their results show that a greater and more uniform negative impact 
on tax efforts of lump sums „untied‟ grants (which was a lump sum amount of around Rs 
2 lakh annually, designed to add to panchayat resources for any purpose of their 
choosing) that are predictable and unvarying than for a more widely defined grants total 
that includes components with year-to-year variability. The results show that an increase 
in the untied grant to panchayats by one rupee reduces own tax revenues in 12 out of 14 
districts by more than one rupee, and in eight of these by more than two rupees. Reverse 
causality is ruled out with the single exception of Malapuram district. The authors 
conclude that the reduction in own tax revenue observed in the Kerala panchayat is 
mainly the result of a selective slackening of tax effort. 
          It is noteworthy to mention here that there is strong interest on this issue in Latin 
America which consequently has led to the publication of a number of studies in the 
Spanish Language. A summary of these studies can be found in Aragon and Gayoso 
(2005). We will now turn our attention to the fiscal arrangements in Malaysia.  
 
2. Fiscal Arrangements in Malaysia 
 
 There are essentially three forms of intergovernmental grants in Malaysia: Tax 
Sharing Grants, General Purpose Grants and Specific Purpose Grants.  
 
2.1. Tax sharing grants 
 
The grants are established under the Article 110(3) of the Federal Constitution, 
the Assignment of Revenue (Export Duty on Iron Ore) Act 1962 & the Assignment of 
Export Duty (mineral Ores) Act 1964. According to the Article, 10% of the revenues 
collected by the Federal government from export duties on tin, iron and minerals ores 
need to be allocated to the producing states.  
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2.2. General Purpose grants 
 
2.2.1. Capitation grant 
 
The grant is established under the Article 109(1)a of the Federal Constitution with 
an objective of assisting state government in meeting financial requirements. The grants 
are not subject to any spending restrictions or tax effort requirements. The amount given 
is based on the population determined by the population census if the last census was 
taken one year before the beginning the financial year or on the annual population 
projection calculated as of the population census. One of the rationales behind the 
introduction of this new rate is to achieve fairer distribution for the poorer states 
assuming that the less populous states are relatively poor states. 
 
2.2.2. Revenue Growth Grant 
 
The grant is established under the Revenue Growth Grant Act 1977 & Revenue 
Growth Grant Act (Amended) 1980. The grant was based on the premise that state 
governments should also benefit from the growth of federal government revenue. The 
grants are payable to the state governments if the total revenue of the Federal government 
after deducting tin duties and taxes raised under the Road Traffic Ordinance 1958 
increases by more than 10% in a particular year over the previous year. The grants are 
however subject to a maximum of RM150 million (originally 100 million). The 
distribution formula of the RM 150 million is as follows 
 
2.2.3. Special grants 
 
Under the article 112c(1)(a) of the Federal Constitution, special grants are 
allocated to the states of Sabah and Sarawak. The objective of these grants is to equalize 
the standard of services of the two states to that of the other states in Peninsular Malaysia. 
  
Special grants are also allocated to Selangor which amount to RM 18 305 637.66 
millions in lieu of revenues losses due to the acquisition of  Kuala Lumpur (this is based 
on the revenue collected in 1974) and to Kedah with an amount of RM10,000 per annum 
according to 1869 agreement for the lands handed over to Penang. 
 
2.2.4. State Reserve Fund grants 
 
The grants are established under the Article 109(6) of the Federal Constitution. 
The grants are sourced from the State Reserve Fund on an ad hoc basis. The main 
purpose of the fund when it was established in 1958 was to supplement the general 
revenue of state government facing current account deficits.   
 
2.2.5. Contingencies fund grant 
 
Established under Article 103 of the Federal Constitution, the grant was intended 
to provide advances in order to meet urgent and unforeseen operating expenditures for 
which no other provisions exist, pending Parliament approval on the required allocation.  
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2.2.6. State Advance Fund grant 
 
The grants were created to provide cash advance to state governments facing cash 
flow problems. The fund was established in 1981. It renders immediate assistance to state 
governments, particularly those with limited financial resources in the form of cash 
advances.  
 
2.3. Specific Purpose grants 
 
2.3.1. State Road grant 
 
The grant is established under the Article 109(1)(b) of the Tenth Schedule, Part 
two of the Federal Constitution. The objective of the grant is to assist State governments 
in maintaining state roads, municipal roads, roads to low cost housing areas and back 
lanes.  
 
2.3.2. Economic Development grants 
 
The objective of the grants is to allocate more funds to less developed states to 
reduce economic and social disparities as well as to promote state development in line 
with the National Economic Plan. The share of each state is determined by the Federal 
government with the cooperation of states EPU based on socio-economic indicators.  
 
2.3.3. Service Charge grant 
 
It is established under the Article 80(5) of the Federal Constitution and the 
National Finance Council in 1978 that concerning investments projects of the state 
governments, 
 
2.3.4. Cost Reimbursement grant 
 
The grant is in support of specific programs in areas of joint responsibility 
between the federal and state governments. The reimbursement is 100% of the 
development expenditure for federally approved agriculture, veterinary, works and 
drainage projects. Meanwhile, for the operating expenditure of the state drainage, 
veterinary and welfare department the reimbursement rate is only 50% of the 
expenditure.  
 
2.3.5. Grant to religious schools and institutions 
 
Since 1956 a special grant was created under the purview of the Ministry of 
Education to assist any registered religious school (with student equal or more than 35) 
not maintained by the Ministry of Education under the Education Act of 1961 or by the 
State government.  
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3. Econometric Estimations 
 
3.1. Methodology 
 
The correlation between tax collection (a proxy for fiscal effort) and transfers 
cannot be construed as evidence of a causal relationship, nor can it indicate how 
subnational governments would respond in term of fiscal efforts exerted if transfers were 
reduced in the future. This is due to the facts that transfer allocations are not a random 
process and local tax collections may have increased because of other relevant but non-
observable variables that were contemporaneous with, but otherwise unrelated to, the 
increase in transfers. In any case, simply regressing local tax collection and transfers will 
produce inconsistent estimates. In order to avoid this problem, some authors have 
resorted to the use of specific events as instruments for federal transfers
2
.  
For want of such an event in Malaysia, we propose the use of  a completely 
different method, namely the stochastic frontier analysis. More specifically we will use 
the Battese and Coelli (1995) model. However, it should be noted that by choosing this 
method, we will provide evidence as to the impact of intergovernmental grants on tax 
efficiency instead of on fiscal effort. Still, the two notions are very closely related to each 
others and to a certain extent can be used interchangeably. Indeed, a stylized 
interpretation of inefficiency is that it captures the “inability” or the “laziness” of 
managers (Syrjänen et al. 2006). Thus, in this research, inefficiency is interpreted as the 
lack of effort of state governments in collecting taxes. 
 
3.2. The Stochastic Frontier Production 
 
 The stochastic frontier production function was independently proposed by 
Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van de Broeck (1977). The original 
specification involved a production function specified for cross-sectional data which had 
an error term which had two components, one which accounts for random effects and the 
other which accounts for technical inefficiency. This model can expressed in the 
following form 
 
),( iiii uvXY         (eq. 1) 
Ni ,.....,1    
Where iY is the production (or the logarithm of the production) of the i-th firm iX  
is a kx1 vector of (transformation of the) input quantities of the i-th firm.   is a vector of 
unknown parameters. The iv are random variables which are assumed to be iid 
N(0, v
2
) and independent of the iu which are non-negative random variables which are 
assumed to account for technical inefficiency in production and are often assumed to be 
iid N(mit, u
2
). 
 
                                                 
2
 For example, in their study of the effects of federal transfers on fiscal efforts in Peru, Aragon and Garyoso 
(2005) exploit the introduction of special transfers in 2001. Similarly, Chapparo et al. (2004) utilize the 
1993 reforms of the Colombian transfer system in order to examine the causal relationship between 
transfers and fiscal efforts. 
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This original specification has been used in a vast number of empirical 
applications over the past two decades. The specification has also been altered and 
extended in a number of ways. Battese and Coelli (1992) propose a stochastic frontier 
production function for panel data which has firm effects which are assumed to be 
distributed as truncated normal random variables, which are also permitted to vary 
systematically with time. The model may be expressed as 
 
),( itititit uvXY        (eq. 2) 
.,......,1,,.....,1 TtNi   
 
where itY  is the logarithm of the production of the i-th firm in the t-th period itX  
is a kx1 vector of (transformation of the) input quantities of the i-th firm in the t-th time 
period.   is as defined earlier. The itv  are random variables which are assumed to be iid 
and independent of  
 
)( Ttn
iit euu
       (eq. 3) 
 
Where the iu  are non-negative random variables which are assumed to account 
for technical efficiency in production and are assumed to be iid. as truncation at zero of 
the N(u
2
) distribution ; n is a parameter to be estimated. 
 
A number of empirical studies have estimated stochastic frontiers and predicted 
firm-level efficiencies using the estimated functions and then regressed the predicted 
efficiencies upon firm-specific variables (such as managerial experience, ownership 
characteristics, etc) in an attempt to identify some of the reasons for differences in 
predicted efficiencies between firms in an industry. This has long been recognized as a 
useful exercise, but the two-stage estimation procedure has also been recognized as one 
which is inconsistent in its assumptions regarding the independence of the inefficiency 
effects in the two estimation stages. The two-stage estimation procedure is unlikely to 
provide estimates as efficient as those that could be obtained using a single-state 
estimation procedure. This issue was addressed by Kumbhakar, Ghosh and McGukin 
(1991) and Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991) who propose stochastic frontier models 
in which the inefficiency effects (ui) are expressed as an explicit function of a vector of 
firm-specific variables and a random error. Battese and Coelli (995) propose a model 
which is equivalent to the Kumbhakar, Ghosh and McGukin (1991) specification, with 
the exceptions that allocative efficiency is imposed, the first-order profit maximizing 
conditions removed, and panel data is permitted. The Battese and Coelli (1995) model 
specification may be expressed as  
 
),( itititit uvXY        (eq.4) 
.,......,1,,.....,1 TtNi   
 
where  itY  , itX  and   are as defined earlier. The itv  are random variables which 
are assumed to be iid N(v
2
).and independent of the itu  which are non-negative 
random variables which are assumed to account for technical inefficiency in production 
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and are assumed to be independently distributed as truncations at zero of the 
N(mit,u
2
).distribution where 
 
itit ZM        (eq. 5) 
 
 Where itZ  is a px1 vector of variables which may influence the efficiency of a 
firm and   is an 1xp vector of parameters to be estimated. 
 
 
3.3. Data Specification 
 
The main data used in this research is sourced from Malaysian state governments‟ 
financial statements which are published and made public by the government on a yearly 
basis. Our data covers the period of 1980 to 2003 which means that we have a total of 
312 observations. Strictly based on data availability, our measure of tax efforts will be 
proxied by the amount of tax actually collected by the state
3
.  
          Although it is highly desirable to have a measure of tax rate included in our 
estimation of tax efficiency, we could not do so due to technical and data constraints. The 
two main fiscal resources of the state government are from land as well as forestry 
resources. In the case of taxes on land, the rates not only varied across states, but they 
also varied across the type, use and location of land. As for forest-based taxes, the rates 
vary according to the type, the circumference, and the age of the tree.  Thus, it will be 
very difficult to come up with a single rate that can summarize all the rates that are being 
used. As such, we decided to not include the tax rate in our estimation and replace it 
instead with the following three variables: the proportion of forest area in order to 
represent the revenues derived from the forestry resources, the rate of urbanization and 
the rate of agricultural activities in order to represent land-based revenues. We also 
include the state gross domestic product in order to represent the level of economic 
activity in each state. Total population is also included since populous states may have an 
upper hand in terms of the amount of taxes collected. Finally, time trends are introduced 
using the variables time and time square. 
          Inefficiencies are modeled as functions of other exogenous variables. These 
variables are observed factors that may explain differences in technical efficiency across 
state governments in Malaysia. The efficiency level of state governments in tax collection 
will in part be determined by the quality of the state apparatus. State governments that are 
equipped with state-of-the-art machinery and qualified personnel are more likely to be 
able to monitor tax collection more efficiently and use due diligence in the case of fraud. 
However, we do not have any data that reflects the quality of the state apparatus. 
Nevertheless, we believe that the latter, is in part, determined by the level of the 
development of the state. Assuming that there is a minimum level of waste and 
corruption, wealthier states should be able to invest more in modern and state-of-the art 
                                                 
3
 According to Besfamille and Sanguinetti (2004), although tax revenue is an accurate and observable 
variable, one can hardly say that it is a good estimate of tax efforts. The reason  is for a given region in a 
given time, tax revenue are affected by a myriad of potential variables, outside the control of local 
governments (like idiosyncratic shocks to some specific tax bases) which are seldom well controlled for  
estimates of tax capacity. 
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equipment in order to upgrade and improve state machinery. Furthermore, since wealthier 
states have better amenities and facilities, they are more likely to attract qualified 
professionals to work for them. Thus, we will retain the level of GDP in order to control 
for the effects of the quality of state apparatus on tax efficiency.  
          It can also be argued that states with smaller land area will be able to administer 
and collect taxes more efficiently than states with a more vast area. On the other hand, 
land area will not pose any problems in term of tax collection if the state government is 
staffed with qualified personnel and equipped with machinery of the latest technology. 
To control for these two effects, we will include in our estimation the land area of a state 
as well as its interaction with the GDP.  Finally in order for us to test for the effects of 
intergovernmental grants on tax efficiency, we include in our regression the share of 
grants in the state governments total expenditures. Table 1 provides the descriptive 
statistics of the variables described above. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics  
 Mean 
Standard 
Errors Min Max 
Own Revenues 
(RM’000) 549.63 358.31 24.64 1790.63 
Forest area (km2) 14911.39 24252.63 66.08 86368.30 
Urbanization rate 
(%) 40.57 14.30 32.04 80.00 
Agricultural 
activities (km2) 218654.38 188207.19 31937.00 1070349.00 
GDP (RM ’000) 10.936 5.950 3.219 37.110 
Population (‘000) 1355.86 754.88 209.10 4498.10 
Grant share (%) 0.31 0.20 0.02 0.81 
Size (km2) 25374.07 34341.67 795.00 124450.00 
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3.4. Empirical Specification 
 
Following Battesse and Coelli (1995), the frontier is defined by  
 
))(exp( itititit uvXTA        (eq. 6) 
 
Where itTA  denotes real total own tax revenues of state i in year t, itX  represents 
a (1 x K) vector of values, which are functions of tax capacity factors, including time for 
the i-th state in the t-th year, the itv are assumed to be independently and identically 
distributed random error terms which have normal distribution with zero mean and 
standard deviation v , the itu  are non-negative unobservable random variables (with 
standard deviation u ) associated with the inefficiency of tax collection, such that, given 
the itX , the observed level of tax collection falls short of potential. 
 
Concurrently with the stochastic frontier, then, we estimate 
 
ititititit WXZZU  '
*       (eq. 7) 
 
where itZ  is a  (1 x M) vector of explanatory variables, including time, associated 
with the technical efficiency effects,   is a (M x 1) vector of unknown parameters to be 
estimated,  '  is a vector of parameters associated with the interaction terms . 
 
itit XZ
* and itW  are unobservable random variables assumed to be independently 
distributed, obtained by truncation of the normal distribution with mean zero and 
variance, 2 , such that the itU  is nonnegative.  
 
Given the specification of the model, the hypothesis that the technical inefficiency 
effects are not random is expressed by H0: 0 , where 22 / u   and 
222
vu   . 
Further, the hypothesis that the technical inefficiency effects are not influenced by the 
level of explanatory variables in equation (2) is examined by testing the significance of 
  and ' . The estimation used Maximum Likelihood methods with the Frontier 4.1 
software. 
 
4.  Results 
 
4.1. Baseline regressions  
 
Relative efficiency can be measured by applying stochastic frontier techniques to 
individual annual samples, and to the total sample as a panel, but in many cases 
efficiency differences are a function of inadequate models and data, even when the 
frontier is stochastic. These two potential difficulties are directly addressed here. First, in 
many cases, a model error is likely because the functional form fitted is usually the Cobb 
Douglas, which is highly restrictive. Thus, the adequacy of the Cobb Douglas form 
should be tested against a flexible functional form, such as the translog. Second, data 
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error is inevitable where a model essentially representing economic production employs 
accounting data. However, apart from measurement error embodied in the available 
variables, failure to adjust for variable omissions and inappropriate aggregation is the 
norm rather than the exception. In addition, a third problem has been highlighted by 
Smith (1997), who has shown that inefficiency levels, or choice of frontier over the 
average production function depend on both the functional form and the level of 
aggregation, even if there are no missing variables. For all these reasons, inefficiencies 
need to be treated with a degree of caution and appropriate tests are required in order to 
select the correct model. This problem has been addressed by Battese and Coelli (1995). 
Their inefficiency model, in which the efficiency differences are simultaneously 
estimated from the stochastic frontier and explained by further variables, incorporates 
tests that choose between functional forms and between frontier and average models. The 
method of maximum likelihood is used to estimate the unknown parameters, with the 
stochastic frontier and the inefficiency effects estimated simultaneously. A number of 
related models can be tested, following the estimation.  
          The first test is the selection of the functional form, where the null hypothesis is 
that the Cobb-Douglas is an adequate representation of the data.  The functional form of 
the stochastic frontier was determined by testing the adequacy of the log-linear model 
relative to the less simplistic translog, which includes cross products and square terms to 
allow for interactions and non-linearities in the data. The results of our test point to the 
rejection of the null hypothesis. We will thus adopt the translog specification
4
. 
          The next test was to determine whether this is indeed a frontier model and not 
simply a mean response function (MRF) or OLS. A weak criterion is a t-test on the 
estimated parameter, γ = σu2/σ2, which is bounded by zero and one. If γ = 0, technical 
inefficiency is not present; hence, the null hypothesis is that γ = 0, indicating that the 
mean response function (OLS) is an adequate representation of the data. The closer this is 
to unity, the more likely it is that the frontier model is appropriate. The results of LR tests 
of the hypothesis show that the technical efficiency effects are not simply random errors. 
          Finally, the power of the LR test is increased by testing the dual null hypothesis 
that both the frontier parameter and all the inefficiency effects are jointly zero γ = δi = 0, 
for all i, meaning that neither the constant term nor the inefficiency effects are present in 
the model. Since γ takes values between 0 and 1, any LR test involving a null hypothesis 
which includes the restriction that γ = 0 has been shown to have a mixed χ2 distribution, 
with appropriate critical values (Kodde and Palm, 1986). The results points to the 
rejection of the null-hypothesis and suggest that the traditional production function is not 
an adequate representation of the data.  
          The results of our frontier estimation are summarized in Table 2. In column A, the 
distribution is assumed to be half normal while in column B, a truncated normal 
distribution is assumed. These maximum likelihood estimators of the translog 
coefficients are not informative. Rather, the elasticities for each of the four inputs, 
calculated from these results, at the variable means, are of interest. These elasticities with 
respect the inputs, xj, for the translog is 
 
                                                 
4
 In order to discriminate between the Cob-Douglas and the Translog specification, we test the hypothesis 
00  jkH   for j>= k = R, NR, E, P by the test of likelihood ratio:-LR = -2{ln [L(Cobb-Douglass)] – 
ln [L(Translog)]}. 
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These estimates can be expressed as 
 
^
 jj         (eq. 9) 
 
where 
^
  is the full vector of the maximum likelihood estimators of the 
parameters and j is a row vector of the same dimension, which has zero entries 
everywhere, except when corresponding to the elements of  involving j and jh. The 
reported standard errors of the elasticities are 
 
'
^^^^
)()( jjj VV         (eq. 10) 
 
where )(
^^
V is the estimated covariance matrix for q. The elasticties are reported in 
table 3. 
 
The parameter of our frontier models indicates that for the first model, only the 
elasticity of GDP if found to be significant. As for our second model, none of the 
elasticities are found to be significant.   
The results of estimates of variables on the efficiency level are presented in table 
4. We are particularly interested in the effects of federal grants on state governments‟ tax 
efficiency. The results show that the share of grants in the state governments‟ total 
expenditure has a positive impact on the level of inefficiency. In other words, the higher 
the share of federal grants of total state expenditure, the lower the tax efficiency. The 
result is robust to the change in distribution. As for the interaction term between grants 
and GDP, the estimates are significant only in the case of a truncated normal distribution. 
Also, the magnitude of the coefficient is rather small. These results imply that the 
intergovernmental grants system in Malaysia is not without consequence on the fiscal 
behavior of state governments. Although at first sight, the system may not seem to have 
any bearing on the fiscal behavior of state governments, our results show that somehow 
its implementation has resulted in the state governments being less efficient in tax 
collection.  
          As for other variables, we found that in model A, size is associated with less 
inefficiency. This may be due to the fact that states with vast area usually have a vast 
forest area and since forest based taxes are relatively easier to administer as compared to 
other taxes (especially land taxes), these states are found to be more efficient than smaller 
states.   
          In Model B, we found that GDP is positively associated with tax inefficiency, 
which contrary to our expectations, implies that wealthier states tend to be less efficient. 
It is also found that the effect of GDP on inefficiency levels is attenuated by the size of 
the state. 
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          The estimates of efficiency levels for each state for the period under study are 
presented in Figure 1. The results show that with the exception of two states, the level of 
tax efficiency of state governments in Malaysia is rather low. During the entire period 
under study, their level of efficiency has never surpassed the 20% level. The fact that 
there is a low level of efficiency is nevertheless not really that surprising, especially 
given the huge amounts of tax arrears that are yet to be collected by state governments.   
          The estimates also show that there is a stark contrast between the performance of 
states situated in Peninsular Malaysia and the two Borneo states of Sabah and Sarawak. 
Indeed, these two states are found to have a relatively higher level of efficiency as 
compared to the rest of the country. It is also noteworthy to mention that the efficiency 
levels of these two states are found to be more volatile. In comparison, the efficiency 
level of the rest of the states fluctuated only within the 0 to 20% band throughout the 
whole period. 
 
 
Table 2. Frontier Estimation Results (full sample) 
 Model A Model B 
 Coefficients Standard 
Errors 
Coefficients Standard 
Errors 
Forest -1.1026 0.8118 -0.5671 0.8275 
Forest
 2 
0.0141 0.0222 0.0073 0.0276 
Urbanization -2.7961 1.8465 -3.6273*** 0.9644 
Urbanization
2 
0.2775 0.3694 0.3017 0.3283 
Agriculture 0.8303 0.6189 1.2362* 0.6795 
Agriculture
2 
-0.0398** 0.0175 -0.0522*** 0.0233 
GDP -4.7509*** 1.4956 -3.9290*** 0.9526 
GDP
2 
-0.6597* 0.3759 -0.7948 0.5186 
Population 5.3438*** 0.9265 4.1761*** 0.8887 
Population
2 
-0.4719 0.2918 -0.4031 0.3683 
Time -0.0423 0.0954 -0.0268 0.1413 
Time
2 
-0.0009 0.0008 -0.0004 0.0017 
Forest *Urbanization 0.2098 0.1459 0.1524 0.1788 
Forest *Agriculture 0.0125 0.0305 0.0166 0.0363 
Forest *GDP -0.0573 0.1283 -0.1108 0.1679 
Forest *Population 0.0484 0.1479 0.0389 0.1713 
Forest *Time -0.0115* 0.0064 -0.0088 0.0084 
Urbanization*Agriculture 0.0462 0.1154 0.0695 0.1361 
Urbanization*GDP 1.6035*** 0.5644 1.7365*** 0.6021 
Urbanization*Population -1.1773** 0.5099 -1.1475** 0.5711 
Urbanization*Time -0.0364 0.0284 -0.0438 0.0345 
Agriculture*GDP -0.0881 0.0973 -0.1236 0.1084 
Agriculture*Population 0.0108 0.0981 -0.0098 0.0010 
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Agriculture*Time 0.0139** 0.0057 0.0181** 0.0079 
GDP*Population 0.9724** 0.4394 1.1052* 0.6572 
GDP*Time -0.0332** 
 
0.0173 -0.0288 0.0189 
Population*Time 0.0461*** 0.0156 0.0336 0.0217 
Constant 4.4791** 1.9915 3.4261*** 0.1005 
Sigma squared 0.3014 0.0268 0.3332 0.0313 
gamma 0.9999 0.0000 0.9999 0.000 
Notes: standard error in parentheses; significant at 10% level*, significant at 5% level**, 
significant at 1% level***. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Efficiency Estimates (full sample) 
 Model A Model B 
 Coefficient Standard 
Errors 
Coefficient Standard 
Errors 
Grants 1.4156*** 0.1522 1.5735*** 0.1609 
GDP -0.4389 0.3011 1.5253*** 0.1046 
Time 0.0013 0.0105 0.0036 0.0124 
Size -0.7130*** 0.1367 0.0983 0.0977 
Table 3. Elasticities of Input (full sample) 
 
Model A Model B 
 
Coefficient Standard Errors Coefficient Standard 
Errors 
Forest -0.1390 
 
0.9927 -0.0949 
 
0.5680 
Urban -0.9827 
 
9.3210 -1.1912 
 
9.7162 
Agric 0.4766 
 
0.5087 0.6001 
 
0.8397 
GDP 22.8293*** 
 
6.6691 3.8366 
 
9.4014 
Pop 3.2443 
 
6.3141 2.7876 
 
6.2499 
Notes: standard error in parentheses; significant at 10% level*, significant at 5% level**, 
significant at 1% level***. 
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Size*GDP 0.0368 0.0302 -0.1391*** 0.0191 
GDP*Grants -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 
Constant 8.8389*** 1.2667   
Notes: standard error in parentheses; significant at 10% level*, significant at 5% level**, 
significant at 1% level***. 
 
 
 
We also note a net difference in the evolution across time of the efficiency level 
of Sabah and Sarawak. In the case of Sabah, we observe a net degradation of its tax 
efficiency across time.  In the early 1980s, this state is the most efficient state in term of 
tax collection. However, in the mid 1980s, there is a sharp drop in its efficiency level 
which continues to deteriorate over the years and then it finally reaches the level of 
efficiency in other states. This evolution is in net contrast to that of the state of Sarawak. 
In the beginning of the period under study, the level of tax efficiency in Sarawak is 
relatively low, especially in comparison to Sabah. However, in 1982, Sarawak has seen 
its level of efficiency increase to finally overtake Sabah as the most efficient state in 
terms of tax collection in the mid- 1980s. The evolution over time of the efficiency level 
of these two states somehow mirrors their standing in terms of financial management in 
the recently published Report by the Auditor General of Malaysia (2003). Indeed, in the 
Report, the Sabah state government is considered as one of the states that are in a dire 
financial situation while Sarawak is identified by the General Auditor as one of the states 
that have the best financial record. 
          The fact that Sabah and Sarawak have a different position in term of their 
efficiency levels as compared to other states do not really come as a surprise. In fact, the 
two states are on a different footing than the rest of the states as far as their revenues and 
responsibilities. This is due to their special position in the Federal Constitution of 
Malaysia. Not only have they devolved with more revenues sources and more 
responsibilities as compared to another 11 states, but they are also entitled to special 
grants from the federal government.  
          Given their special position, it may seem inappropriate to put these two states in 
the same basket as the rest of the states. And, the relatively low efficiency level of the 
rest of the states as found in our estimations may be due to the inclusion of these two 
states in our sample. Indeed, it can be argued that the low estimates of the efficiency 
levels of these states may not signify that they are very inefficient but rather that they are 
relatively inefficient in comparison to Sabah and Sarawak. Thus, in the next section we 
will re-estimate our regression by dropping the two states from our sample. 
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Figure 1. Efficiency Estimates (full sample) 
More Developed States 
 
 
Less Developed States 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Average more developed and less developed states 
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4.2. Sub-sample of Peninsular Malaysia 
 
After dropping the two states of Sabah and Sarawak from our sample,  we re-
estimate our regression. The We results of our new estimations are presented in Table 5. 
Again, based on these parameters, we calculated the elasticity for each of the independent 
variable. These results are presented in Table 6.  In model A, none of the elasticities are 
statistically significant. However, in model B the elasticity of GDP is found to be 
significant. In Table 7, we present the efficiency estimates. 
          As far as the estimates of the level of inefficiency is concerned, we found that even 
after dropping Sabah and Sarawak from our sample, federal grants are still positively 
associated with inefficiency levels. These results may suggest that the association found 
previously between federal grants and tax efficiency is not spurious. Yet, the magnitude 
of the coefficient is somehow smaller than the one found in our preceding estimation. We 
also found that the effects of federal grants on inefficiency levels to be conditional on 
GDP. The result implies that the level of GDP will attenuate the negative impact of 
federal grants on efficiency levels. In other words,, federal grants are found to be more 
disastrous for tax efficiency amongst poorer states. However it should be noted that the 
magnitude of the coefficient for the interaction term is rather small. 
As for other explanatory variables, we found that the coefficients of GDP to be 
positively associated with tax inefficiency, indicating that wealthier states tend to be less 
efficient in tax collection. On the other hand, it is also found that a higher dependence on 
grants, as well more vast land area attenuate the negative impact of GDP on inefficiency 
levels.  
The scores of the efficiency levels for each state are presented in Figure 2. In 
contrast to our previous estimates, state governments are found to be more efficient this 
time. The average efficiency level for all states during the period under study is 67%. The 
results suggest that the low efficiency level of the Peninsular states found previously is 
due to the inclusion of Sabah and Sarawak in our sample. It is noteworthy that state 
governments differ widely in term of tax efficiency. The most efficient states are Perak 
and Pahang and the less efficient are Perlis and Penang. In figure 2, we separate the 
estimates of efficiency levels according to the level of development in the states. It seems 
that the level of efficiency does not depend on the level of development as both groups 
have their fair share of very efficient and less efficient states. Indeed, the average of 
efficiency levels for both groups is almost the same for both groups as shown in the lower 
panel of Figure 2. 
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Table 5. Frontier Estimation Results (Peninsular Malaysia)  
 Model A Model B 
 Coefficients Standard 
Errors 
Coefficients Standard 
Errors 
Forest 0.6157 0.9328 0.5077 0.8757 
Forest
2 
0.0023 0.0261 0.0030 0.0264 
Urbanization 3.6591** 1.8277 3.2270* 1.7600 
Urbanization
2 
-0.0022 0.3889 0.0662 0.3818 
Agriculture 0.8974** 0.4274 0.9765 0.6733 
Agriculture
2 
-0.0203 0.0181 -0.0174 0.0209 
GDP -3.0553** 1.2036 -3.3179*** 1.2507 
GDP
2 
-0.3804 0.4326 -0.3763 0.4436 
Population 4.8254** 1.9261 5.3012*** 1.2655 
Population
2 
-0.5331 
 
0.3583 -0.5661* 0.3152 
Time -0.1523 0.0973 -0.1265 0.1298 
Time
2 
-0.0021 0.0013 -0.0020 0.0013 
Forest*Urbanization -0.1551 0.1733 -0.1512 0.1746 
Forest*Agriculture 0.0127 0.0276 0.0111 0.0283 
Forest*GDP -0.1509 0.1361 -0.1468 0.1330 
Forest*Population 0.0592 0.1512 0.0706 0.1549 
Forest*Time 0.0016 0.0084 0.0017 0.0082 
Urbanization*Agriculture 0.0369 0.1321 0.0272 0.1374 
Urbanization*GDP 0.7015 0.6760 0.7271 0.6779 
Urbanization*Population -0.8305 0.6251 -0.8361 0.6086 
Urbanization*Time -0.0065 0.0231 -0.0114 0.0299 
Agriculture*GDP -0.1247 0.0875 -0.1246 0.0890 
Agriculture*Population -0.0086 0.0651 -0.0201 0.0898 
Agriculture*Time 0.0094 0.0063 0.0084 0.0070 
GDP*Population 1.0479** 0.4930 1.0591** 0.4938 
GDP*Time -0.0324 0.0212 -0.0331 0.0218 
Population*Time 0.0431** 0.0212 0.0438** 0.0219 
Constant -
19.8381*** 
0.8859 -
20.3323*** 
1.0315 
Sigma squared 0.3322   0.0131   0.3295   0.0246   
gamma 0.2215   0.0579   0.3273   0.0779   
Notes: standard error in parentheses; significant at 10% level*, significant at 
5% level**, significant at 1% level***. 
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Table 6. Frontier Estimation Results  
 
Model A Model B 
 
Coefficient Standard 
Errors 
Coefficient Standard 
Errors 
Forest -0.0322 
 
0.6645 0.3387 
 
0.5416 
Urban 0.1285 
 
10.0599 -0.1217 
 
8.3845 
Agric 0.3842 
 
0.3827 0.3567 
 
0.6285 
GDP 2.0330 
 
6.6390 14.733*** 4.1549 
Pop 3.7294 
 
10.7510 3.9682 
 
8.2150 
Notes: standard error in parentheses; significant at 10% level*, significant at 5% 
level**, significant at 1% level***. 
 
 
 
Table 7. Efficiency Estimates (Peninsular Malaysia) 
 Model A Model B 
 Coefficient Standard 
Errors 
Coefficient Standard 
Errors 
Grants 1.2237***   0.0984   1.2026***   0.1489 
GDP 0.7238**   0.3031   0.9133***   0.1006   
Time 0.0039   0.0121   0.0019   0.0142   
Size   -0.1250   0.3488 -0.0169   0.1191 
GDP* Size -0.0687**   0.0289 -0.0937***   0.0266 
GDP*Grants -0.0000**   0.0000 -0.0000*   0.0000 
Constant 0.7906   3.1211     
Notes: standard error in parentheses; significant at 10% level*, significant at 5% 
level**, significant at 1% level***. 
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Figure 2. Efficiency estimates (Peninsular Malaysia).  
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Conclusion 
 
The main objective of this paper is to examine the relationship between the fiscal 
performance of the state governments in Malaysia with the political and institutional 
environment within which they evolve. The focus of our analysis is the 
intergovernmental transfers system which constitutes an essential part of any 
intergovernmental and decentralized system.  
 More particularly, we tried to analyze the impact of federal grants to state 
governments‟ fiscal efficiency. Indeed, the general observation of a continuous 
deterioration in the financial situation in Malaysia brings us to question if state 
governments are making enough effort in exploiting all the revenue sources that are 
available. Moreover, one may wonder if the intergovernmental grants system is one of 
the causes that led state governments to remain slack in tax efforts.  
     Fiscal effort is measured by the amount of taxes collected by the state government and 
the impact of federal grants on fiscal efforts is assessed by using the stochastic frontier 
analysis methodology. The advantage of using this method is that it allows us to obtain 
both the estimates of efficiency level as well as the determinants of the efficiency level.  
     Our estimations results seem to point to the fact that there is indeed a negative impact 
of federal grants on the tax efficiency of the state governments in Malaysia. The results 
suggest that an increase in federal grants is associated with a decrease in the tax 
efficiency of the state governments. On the other hand, the estimates also show that there 
is on average a slight increase in the level of tax efficiency of the state governments in 
Malaysia across time. Together, these two results suggest that a higher level of efficiency 
could be achieved if necessary steps are taken to minimize the effects of federal grants.   
     A negative relationship between federal grants and fiscal efficiency has serious policy 
implications. It suggests that the state governments have failed to mobilize their tax 
potentials to the maximum and preferred to rely on federal transfers instead to finance 
their expenditures. The danger of being too dependent on federal grants has been widely 
covered in the literature. However, within the context of our study, transfer dependence 
can also lead to another problem namely underdeveloped local tax system. Due to federal 
grants, state governments can be discouraged from investing in the improvement of their 
tax system. Since federal grants are easily made available to them, state governments 
may not find it worthwhile to employ the latest technology or to hire more qualified 
personnel. Without these investments local tax system will not be able to cope with the 
latest development in the society and become less and less productive. This in turn will 
lead to a higher dependence on federal grants thus creating a vicious circle. 
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